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MARGARE'l' h PLUMEH, Hespondent, v. EVERETT T.
PI_~UMEH, Appellant.
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of AllowanceEffect of Agreement of Parties.-~When an order for support
payments in a divorce decree is based on an agreement of the
parties, the possibility of subsequent modification of the order
without the consent of both parties depends on the nature
of the agreement.
[2] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.--vVhere husband and wife agree to a
simple division of their property or agree that one party is
to receive the lion's share of the marital property and the
other money payments, not in satisfaction of a statutory right
to support but solely to equalize the division of the marital
property, the agreement is a true property settlement unconcerned with rights and duties as to support; the court may
approve such agreement and in addition order the payment of
alimony, and such order is subject to modification on an adequate showing of changed circumstances. ( Civ. Code, § 139.)
[3] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife agree that
the wife will receive specified money payments in lieu of the
statutory right to ~upport, such au agreement is a true "alimony" or "support and maintenanct,"
and a support order based thereon is modiliable uu an ad(•tpmte showing
of changed cin,umstanees.
[4a-4c] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife enter
into a hybrid agreement to settle not only property rights but
rights and duties as to support, the possibility of modifying
an order for support based on such an agreement without the
consent of the parties depends on whether the provisions for
division of property and the provisions for support are severable rather than integrated; if they are integrated the order
may not he modified unless the parties have provided for or
agreed to such a modification.
[5] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties:
Modification of Allowance.-An agreement betwePn husband
and wife is integrated if the parties have agreed that the
See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 9, 10] Divorce, § :21G(l);
,·oree, ~§ 203, 216(1); [6~8] DivorcP, ~ 203.
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to division of property and those relating
reciprocal consideration, since the support provisions are then necessarily part and parcel of a
division of property; such an agreement would be destroyed
by subsequPnt modification of a support order based thereon
without the consPnt of the parties, and it is immaterial whether
or not the marital property is divided equally, that the amount
of the marital property is small, or that the agreement calls
for payments for "support" or "alimony."
[6] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.An agreement between husband and wife providing that their
purpose is to reach a final settlement of their rights and duties
with respect to both property and support, that they intend
each provision to be in consideration for each of the other
provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out of the
marib l relationship except those Pxpressly set out in the
ngrPement, will he deemed eonc]usive evidence that they int<'nded an intf'grated agreement.
[7] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.~
~Where husband and wife may he uncertain as to the value or
legal ownership of property, or uncertain which of them is
entitled to a divorcf' and on what grounds and therefore
uncertain as to thf'ir legal rights with respect to support and
the division of property, an agreement for a specified division
of property and sperified support payments settling such uncertainties is integrated in the absence of convincing proof
that they intended it to be severable.
[8] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.~
\Vhere an agreemmt hetwf'en husband and wife deals both
with rights to marital property and rights to snpport, and
thf'y haYe set forth their purpose "to effect a final and complete sdt!Pment of their . . . rights . . . with reference to
their maritnl status and to each other" and have released each
other from all claims arising out of the marital relationship
Pxerpt as provided in the agreement, the inference is clear
that the parties intended an integrated agreement; it is not
necessary that they expressly recite such an intent when thf'
ngref'ment itself mnkes the intent clear.
[9] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-A provision in an ngreement betwePn husband and wife that "For purposes of this agreement
no earnings of 'Wife or other income obtained by her shall
he eonsidpred as a 'changed condition' and taken into consideration in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain
a reduction in payment for support of \Vife or said child, ...
except such portion of said earnings or other income as shall
exceed the gross average monthly sum of Two Hundred Fifty

822
on an adequate
income did not
increase in her income would
condition.
[10] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-A reduction
the
ments for wife
would
violate
between the
that
to Wife shall

their modification.
APPEAL from an order of the
of
1e\ngeles County dismissing application fot' modification
judgment of divorce. Elmer D. Doyle,
Reversed.
Fogel, Mcinerny & vVest, ,James E.
Edmondson for Appellant.

Jr., and Steven

Hahn, Ross & Saunrlers anrl B. Lloyd Saunders for
spondenL
TRAYNOR. J.-On
fendant entered into an agreement "to effect
complete settlement of their rct>peetiYe
port, alimony and custody of their child with reference
their marital statns and to eaeh other.'' Pa
the agreement obligates defendant to pay
month ''for the support
custody of said child until he sl1all reach the age of
" Paragraph nine provides that defendant shall pay
plaintiff an additional $200 per month ''as alimony for her
support and maintenance . . . . ' In
each party releases the other from all
claims and rights to support, separate
court costs, attorneys' fees, and all property
kind except as provirled for in the ""'''r>r>m
graphs deal with the division of marita1
ment of debts, future education of the
and modification of the ;mpport

decree of divorce

in defendant's income as a basis for
the matter to a commissioner,
who found in
favor, the court dismissed the order
to show cause. Defendant appeals, contending that the agreement
not
and that even if it is, a material
reduction in his income is a ground for modification within
the express
of the agreement.
[1] When an order for support payments in a divorce
decree is based on an agreement of the parties, the possibility
of
modification of the order without the consent
of both parties depends on the nature of the agreement
Prior to Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265], the
to classify all separation agreements either
settlement" agreements or as "alimony" or
and maintenance" agreements. (Ettlinger v. Ett3 Cal.2d 172, 177-179 [44 P .2d 540) ; Puckett v.
21 Cal.2d 833, 841-842 [136 P.2d 1] ; Hough v. Hough,
26 Cal.2d 605, 614-615 [160 P.2d 15] .) If the underlying
was a "property settlement" agreement, the "sup, order could not be modified without the consent of
v. Ettlinger, supra, 3 Cal.2d at 177if the underlying agreement was for "aliand maintenance,'' the support order was
modifiable upon a
of changed circumstances. (Hough
supra, 26 Cal.2d at 612.) In Adams v. Adams,
supra, 29 Ca1.2d at
and in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.
41
P.2d
recognized that hybrid agreements to settle not only "'""·"n.'"'' rights but rights and duties
as to support are sui nc.,,,.,.• o
[2] rrhe
are free to limit their agreement to propmay, for example, agree to a simple divi1

"
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sion. Or they may agree that one
is to rcecive the lion's
share of the marital property and the other money payments,
not in satisfaction of a statutory right to support, but solely
to equalize the division of the marital property; such an
agreement is a true property settlement unconcerned with
rights and duties as to support. The court, therefore, may
approve the agreement and in addition order the payment of
alimony (Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Cal.2d at G25), and such
an order is subject to modification on an adequate showing
of changed circumstances. ( Civ. Code, § 139.)
[3] The parties are likewise free to limit their agreement
to their rights and duties as to support. They may, for
example, agree that the wife will receive specified money
payments in lieu of the statutory right to support. Such an
agreement is a true" alimony" or" support and maintenance"
agreement, and under the rule of Hongh v. Hough, supra, 26
Cal.2d 605, 612, a support order based thereon is modifiable
on an adequate showing of changed circumstances.
[4a] Frequently, however, the parties enter into a hybrid
agreement as in the Adams and Dexter cases and in 111essenger
v. 111essenger, 46 Cal.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988]. The possibility
of modifying an order for support based on such an agreement without the consent of the parties, depends upon whether
the provisions for division of property and the provisions for
support are severable rather than integrated. If they are
integrated the order may not be modified unless the parties
have provided for or agreed to such a modification. (Dexter v.
Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 40.)
[5] .An agreement is integrated if the parties have agreed
that the provisions relating to division of property and the
provisions relating to support constitute reciprocal consideration. The support provisions are then necessarily part and
parcel of a division of property. Such an agreement would
be destroyed by subsequent modification of a support order
based thereon, without the consent of the parties. (Dexter v.
Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 41-42; Messenger v. Messenger,
snpra, 46 Cal.2d at 62G, G27-f528; Herda v. Herda, ante.
pp. 228, 231-232 [308 P.2d 705].) It is immaterial whether
or not the marital property is divided equally. (Dexter v.
Dexter, snpra, 42 Cal.2d at 43; Messenger v.111essenger, snpra,
46 Cal.2d at 627-628.) It is immaterial that the amount of
the marital property is small. (Herda v. Herda, supm, ante,
at p. 232.) It is lik('Wise immaterial that tlw agT(•emellt
calls for payments for "support" or "alimony." (111essenger
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v. llfessenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 624-625 and eases there
cited.)
[4b] A support ord('r based upon an integrated agreement
may be modified if the parties so provide. (Flynn v. Flynn,
42 Cal.2d 55, 61 [265 P.2d 865].) Absent such a provision,
it cannot. [6] An agreement providing that the purpose of
the parties is to reach a final settlement of their right,; and
duties with respect to both property and support, that they
intend each provision to be in consideration for each of the
other provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out
of the marital relationship except those expressly set out in
the agreement, will be deemed conelusive evidence that the
parties intended an integrated agreement. (llfessenger v.
llfessenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 628; Anderson v. llfart, 47 Cal.
2d 274, 279 [303 P.2d 539]; Herda v. Herd.a, s11pra, ante,
at p. 232.) Even absent one or more of the foregoing provisions, there may be other proof that the parties intended an
integrated agreement. (Dexter v. Dexter, S1tpra, 42 Cal.2d
at 41.) [7] Thus, the parties may be uncertain as to the
value or legal ownership of property. They may be uncertain
which of them is entitled to a divorce and on what ground,;
and therefore uncertain as to their legal rights with respect
to support and the division of property. An agreement for a
specified division of property and specified support paymentR
settling such uncertainties is integrated in the absence of convincing proof that the parties intended it to be severable.
(See Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 43; 111 essenger v.
111essenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 627-628.)
[8] Under the foregoing rules the agreement in the present
case is clearly integrated. It deals both with rights to marital
property and rights to support. The parties have set forth
their purpose "to effect a final and complete settlement of
their . . . rights . . . with reference to their marital status
and to each other." They have released each other from all
elaims arising out of the marital relationship except as provided in the agreement. The inference is clear that the
parties intended an integrated agreement. It iR not necessary
that the parties expressly recite such an intent when the
agreement itself makes the intent clear. (Dexter v. Dexter,
supra, 42 Cal.2d at 41.)
[4c] Our conclusion tl1at tlw agTeNncnt is integr·ated, howevrr, does not disposr of the ease, for, as noted earlier, an
order for support based upon au iutegrated agreement may be
modified if the parties have expressly so provided. (Flynn v.
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42 CaL2d at 61.) [9]
of the
:"For purposes of this
no ean1~
of "Wife or other· income obtained
her shall be consid .
condition' and taken into consideration in
ered as a '
of Husband to obtain a reduction
such
or other income as shall exceed the
gross average monthly sum of Two Hundred
Dollars.
Both
concede that this
of the
for modification of the court's support orders. Plain .
tiff contends,
that the provision should be read as
recognizing only a single ground for modification, namely.
or other income obtained by plaintiff in excess of
an average of $250 per month. The plain language of the
provision, however, indicates that the parties contemplated
modification upon an adequate showing of changed circum .
stances with a single limitation, that so long as plaintiff's
earnings or other income did not exceed the monthly average
of $250, any increase in her income would not be considered
a changed condition. We conclude, therefore, that upon a
proper showing of a material reduction in defendant's income,
the trial court may in its judicial discretion modify its order
requiring payments for the support of plaintiff and the child.
[10] Plaintiff contends that a reduction in the amount of
the payments for her support would violate a provision found
in paragraph nine of the agreement, which reads: "Husband's
obligation to pay said alimony to Wife shall cease upon her
death or remarriage, except that in the case of her remarriage
said payments shall be eontinned until five ( 5) years from
September 25, 1954, notwithstanding the fact that Wife may
have remarried within said period of time.'' This provision,
however, deals oniy with the termination of support payments,
not with their modification. It provides only that "payments''
shall continue, and a reduction in the amount of the payments
pursuant to paragraph ten will not violate its terms.
The order dismissing defendant's application for modification of the decree is reversed for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Gibson, C.

Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

Shenk, ,T., and Schauer, ,J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, .J.-I dissent.
The majority
is inconsistent m itself as well as
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decisions of this court. In the case at bar it is
by the majority, that the agreement under consideration
was an
property settlement
which could
not be modified unless the
had
to a modification. Then it is held that
the fact that the
one eondition upon which the
be modified, that defendant was entitled to a modification
because his income had been redueed-a condition not menioned in the
for the modification of the
as follows : '' :F'or purposes of this agreement no
earnings of vVife or other income obtained by her shall be
considered as a 'changed condition' and taken into consideration in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain a
reduction in payment for support of \Vife or said child, John
Daniel Plumer, except such portion of said eamings or other
income as shall exceed the gross average monthly snm of Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00). 'Average Monthly' earnings or income shall be computed on the lmsis of the total
earnings or income of ·wife (other than Husband's payments
to her) for the twelve months prior to the filing of Husband's
petition for reduction divided by twelve.'' The agreement is
eornpletely silent as to any other provision or stipulation for
modification of the support payments to be made by the husband. A majority of this court adds its own provision for
modification to an admittedly integrated agreement and concludes "that upon a proper showing of a material reduction
in defendant's income, the trial court may in its judicial discretion modify its order requiring payments for the support
of plaintiff and the child.'' That the support and maintenarwe provisions of the agreement were intended as a division
of property is clearly shown by the provision in the agreement that the payments to the wife shall continue until her
remarriage bnt that notwithstanding her reman·iage the paynw'lds are to be continued nntil five years from September
19.)4. In other words the parties intended that the wife
was to receive a certain sum of money whether or not she
remarried. A more complete expression of the parties' intention as to the division of their property is difficult to imagine.
The majority, sensing a need to gloss over its interference
with the parties' agreement, tells us that the provision whereby
plaintiff was to receive payments for five years from September 25, 1954, was a provision dealing "only with the
termination of support payments, not with their modification.

with
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It provides only that 'payments' shall continue, and a reduc-

tion in the amount of the payments pursuant to paragraph
ten will not violate its terms.'' The parties contemplated
only one reason for modifying the payments and that was if
the plaintiff's separate income exceeded $250 exclusive of
the payments made to her by defendant. A majority of this
eourt has expanded the parties' agreement to inelude another
reason-a reduetion in the defendant husband's income.
I am firmly of the opinion that, in the absence of consent
by the parties, a court has no power to modify an agreement,
whether as to a division of their property or for the purpose of
support, entered into by the parties when there has been no
fraud, overreaching or undue influence. Anything said by me
to the eontrary in the case of Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605
[160 P.2d 15], is hereby expressly disapproved by me. In
subsequent cases I have made my views dearly known (seteoncurring and dissenting opinions in Dexter· v. Dexter, 42
Cal.2d 36, 44 [265 P.2d 873] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49, 53
[265 P.2d 881] ; Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55, 62 [265 P.2d
865] ; Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal.2d 274, 284 [303 P.2d 539] ;
Herda v. Herda, ante, pp. 228, 235 [308 P.2cl 705] ; and
eoneurring opinion in Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d 619.
630 [297 P.2d 988]). I feel that sinee the code ( Civ. Code,
~§ 158, 159, 175) gives to the parties the right to contraet with
eaeh other, their eontraet (in the absence of fraud or overreaching) should be aecorded the same dignity accorded
other contracts.
In Dexter v. Dexter, strpra, 42 Cal.2d 36, 42, a majority
of this court there held : ''. . . the court cannot, after the
interlocutory decree has become final, add a provision for alimony or modify the amount of payments ordered pursuant to
a property settlement agreement. Accordingly, if plaintiff
was satisfied with her contract whereby she had made
the support and maintenance provisions an integral part of the
settlement of property rights and had tenable grounds for
setting it aside, she should have attacked the agreement before
the interlocutory decree was entered. She cannot, however.
after having secured its approval by the court and havingaccepted the benefits thereof, now seek relief inc~onsistent with
its terms." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar the
majority admits that the agreement involved was an integrated
property settlement agreement. It is even admitted that a
property settlement agreement containing support provisions
cannot be modified in the absence of a provision in the agree-
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ment providing for modification. Having paid lip service to
prior decisions, the majority then writes in its own provision
for modification. It is at once apparent that the majority
holding in the case at bar is directly contrary to what was
held and said in the Dexter case in the passage heretofore
quoted. In the case at bar, defendant husband accepted the
benefits of his bargain and now seeks to be relieved of the
burdens.
In Fox v. Fox, sttpra, 42 Cal.2d 49, 52, 53, a majority of
this court said: ''. . . it is clear that the provisions for the
support and maintenance of plaintiff are an integral and inseverable part of the property settlement agreement of the
parties." And "Similarly, the fact that the payments might
be reduced under certain specified circttmstances does not
indicate that they were alimony. Not only may the parties
include such provisions in agreements that are admittedly
solely property settlements (Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal.
625, 628 [206 P. 79]), but the provision in this case lends
support to the conclusion that at least part of the payments
constituted a division of property as such. Thus in no event
were the payments to fall below $200 per month, and they
were to cease on a fixed date withmtt reference to plaintiff's
needs or defendant's ability to pay after that time." (Emphasis added.) It should be recalled that in the case at bar
plaintiff was to receive a definite sum regardless of her needs
and regardless of defendant's ability to pay; and that the
payments were to continue until a certain date regardless of
plaintiff's remarriage. Only one specified condition was
made for modification and that condition has not been met.
In Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal.2d 55, 60, a majority of
this court held: "An examination of the property settlement incorporated by reference in the interlocutory decree
makes clear that it is an integrated bargain of the type considered in Dexter v. De.xter, ante, p. 36 [265 P.2d 873], and
Fox v. Fox, ante, p. 49 f265 P.2d 881]. Accordingly, the
provi~1:ons for monthly payments may not be modified contrary to its terms . ... Since the parti.cs have provided that
the cmtrt may modify the payments ordered pursuant to the
terms of their agreement, the court has jttrisdiction to do so in
accordance with the agreern.ent." (Emphasis added.) It was
concluded that the defendant might "renew his motion for
a reduction in the monthly payments in accordance with the
terms of the property settlement agreement any time the facts
so jtrstify."

PLVJ\IER

It appears to me that it should be obvions to
alike that the holding in the ease at bar
inconsistent with the holding in the Flynn case.
In
, supra, 46 Cal.2d 619,
a maof this court held that " . . . the pariies have made the
for
an
of their
settle.
" 'I' hat "Plaintiff was entitled to agree ...
division of the
and maintenanee
he
rN1need." 1\nd that "\Vith sueh r:ondnsive evidence of
support and maintenance or
1'! the
(Sec;
Y. Plunn, supra, 42 Cal.
61, and eases cited.) The r:onrt may not,
'£nsert u.·hat has been omJttcd' (Code Civ. Proe., § 18i':i8) a.nrl
Ill
the clearly
agreement of thG
parties." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar tl1is court
has "inserted ·what has been omitted" and has, thereby,
abrogated the "clearly expressed agreement of the parties"!
So, again, the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with
its opinion in the Messenger case.
Tn Anderson v. JYla.rt, supra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 279, a majority
of this court, quoting from the Messenger case, held that
the eonclusion was inescapable that the parties had made
the proYision for thr wife's support an intrgral part of thr~
property settlement agreement. Tt was held that since the
property settlement agreemrnt. made no provision for termi,
nation of the support paymr~11ts to the wife and since thr
partirs haa
in aec:ordaner with t1wir agreement entered
into a written modification of its terms, that the wife >vas
PHi it h•d to rr(·oyrr from the lmshawl ':-; estate the present ,·ahw
of the amount attributable io her support for the remainder
of lwr life expcctan<'y. 'I'he majority hel(1, again quoting
from the Messenger case, that " . . . tbe provisions for support and maintenanee or alimony wonld be subject to modification only if the parties expressly so provided." The court
refused to consider defendant's theory that the support provisions were intended by the parties to end with the death of
the payor and held that since there had been no written
modification as provided for in the agreement the payments
rlid not terminate. In the case at bar, no provision was made
for modifi('Htion of the wife's support payments in thA event
of a i!Aerease in the husband's ineome hut the majority of
thi" ('onrt hns
:mppliHl that omiAsion and has

,J
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the
' clearly
v. Messenger·, 46 Cal.2d 619, 626 [297 P.2d 988] .)
As I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in II erda v.
Herda, supra,
pp. 228, 235, the majority reached an
different result on similar facts than was reached in
the Anderson case. Here again it was held by the majority
that the support payments were an integral and
part of the property settlement agreement entered into between the parties. But even though no termination date was
expressed in the agreement and even though no mention was
made concerning the termination of the payments on the
wife's remarriage or the death of the husband, a majority of
this court held that ''Since the agreement in the present
(•ase dealt primarily with support rights and the payments
were described as for support and maintenance, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated
that the payments should continue for plaintiff's [wife's]
benefit after the obligation to support the children had terminated .... " (Emphasis added.) In both the Herda and
Anderson cases where different results were reached the majority relies upon the Messenger case. Because there was no
provision for the support payments to cease upon the husband's death, the majority in the Anderson case held that
plaintiff was entitled to recover from the husband's estate
for the balance of her life expectancy; in the Herda case,
even though there was no provision for the wife's support
payments to cease on her remarriage, the majority held that
"it would be unreasonable to conclude" that the parties had
not intended such payments to cease when the wife remarried.
As long as a majority of this court continues to rewrite
the parties' agreements for them, add provisions which are
not present, constitute itself the trier of fact and, in general,
refuses to permit property settlement agreements to be enforced according to the rules applicable to other contracts,
this state of ultimate confusion will exist in this field of the
law in California. It is unfortunate that this court is the
court of last resort in this field and that there is no higher
authority to lay down a workable rule of law so that attorneys
can, with some measure of certainty, advise their clients.
I would affirm the order dismissing defendant's application
for modification of the decree.

